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Abstract 
Young children consistently overestimate their judgments of how well they will perform 
on a picture recall task compared to their actual performance (Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970; 
Lipko-Speed, 2013; Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009).  Previous researchers have 
investigated ways to make children more aware of their actual abilities (Lipko-Speed, 2013; 
Schneider, 1998; Stipek, Roberts, & Sanborn, 1984).  This study examines the influence of self-
assisted monitoring on young children’s overconfidence.  Specifically, children will monitor 
their own performance on a recall task with the help of an experimenter.  Such monitoring is 
expected to lower children’s overconfidence in their future performance predictions on a recall 
task.  50 four- and five- year olds were randomly matched by gender to one of two groups: an 
experimenter monitored group or a self-assisted monitored group.  All children participated in 
four trials of a picture recall task during which they made 2 recall predictions and 2 recall 
attempts per trial, each with different sets of pictures.  The procedure for the experimenter 
monitored group was modeled after Lipko-Speed (2013).  Specifically, after each recall attempt, 
children were told by the experimenter, who had been monitoring their recall, how many pictures 
they had correctly recalled.  In the self-assisted monitored group, children (with some assistance) 
monitored the accuracy of their own recall attempts.  Both groups lowered their predictions 
within and between trials, however their overconfidence persisted.  Children’s overconfident 
performance predictions did not decrease within or between trials in either group.  Hence, the 
implementation of this investigation’s self-assisted monitoring task did not aid in decreasing 
children’s overconfident judgment predictions on future tasks. 
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The Effects of Self-monitoring on Children’s Recall Predictions 
Previous research has shown that young children are persistently overconfident in their 
judgments of how they think they will perform, compared to how they actually perform (e.g., 
Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970; Lipko-Speed, 2013; Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009; 
Powel, Bolich, & Stewart, 1993; Powell, Morelli, & Nusbaum, 1994; Schneider, 1998; Shin, 
Bjorklund, & Beck, 2007; Stipek, Roberts, & Sanborn, 1984; Stipek & Maclver, 1989).  Such 
overconfident judgment predictions may result in negative learning outcomes for children in 
educational settings.  If children believe they have learned material successfully, but have 
actually overestimated how much they learned, it could result in poor future performance (Lipko-
Speed, 2013). With age, overconfidence decreases and awareness of one’s own abilities 
increases. (Serra & Dunlosky, 2005).  Although older children are able to make more accurate 
prediction judgments compared to younger children, their initial predictions are typically above 
their actual performance level (Clifford, 1978; Flavell et al., 1970; Lipko et al., 2009; Lipko-
Speed, 2013; Powell et al., 1993; Powell et al., 1994; Schneider, 1998; Stipek et al., 1984; 
Yussen & Levy, 1975).  Researchers have investigated this persistent overconfidence using many 
tasks and across a range of ages. 
Flavell et al. (1970) were among the first researchers to study children’s overconfidence 
on a memory task.  Children in nursery school, kindergarten, second grade, and fourth grade 
were asked to give predictions of how many pictures they would be able to remember. Children 
were asked to study ten pictures and then to predict how many out of the ten they would be able 
to remember.  Their prediction memory span was determined by the amount of the longest series 
of pictures they estimated to remember.  After each trial, another picture was added to the 
original list and children were asked if they would be able to remember the pictures.  Across all 
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ages, the children’s prediction memory span was higher than their actual memory span.  The 
children in nursery school and kindergarten, however, gave higher predictions of their memory 
span than second and fourth graders.  Thus, younger children were more overconfident when 
making their predictions, thinking they would be able to remember more than they actually 
could.  Older children displayed some overconfidence but gave overall lower prediction 
judgments than the younger children.  This study prompted future investigations on children’s 
overconfidence in their performance on both memory and psychomotor tasks as well as 
investigations about reasons why children are so overconfident.  
One plausible explanation for children’s overconfident performance judgments on 
physical tasks is the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis, which suggests that young children do not 
separate their expectations from their wishes.  In other words, they expect to achieve what they 
wish to achieve and as a result, they are overconfident (Stipek et al., 1984).  Historically, 
investigators have examined the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis by asking preschool children to 
perform psychomotor tasks.  Stipek et al. (1984) investigated whether children differentiated 
their wishes from their expectations.  Four-year-olds completed a tower task that required them 
to pull a string that lifts a cart up the tower.  In the cart, there was a marble that had a magnet on 
it.  The researchers were able to either turn the magnet on or off, determining whether the ball 
stayed in or fell out of the cart.  A colored track was inserted on the tower after each trial to 
indicate where the ball had fallen off.  Prior to the start of each trial, children were either asked, 
“How high do you want the car to go when you play the game?” or, “How high do expect the car 
to go when you play the game?”  They were given five opportunities to see how high they would 
be able to get the cart to the top of the tower.  Before each prediction the experimenter directed 
the children to the colored track and verbally reminded them where the marble had last fallen off.  
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They then made a new prediction of how high they could pull the cart up the tower without the 
marble falling off.  Researchers found that children’s wishes did not differ from their 
expectancies.  They wished they would be able to pull the cart just as high as they expected to, 
which supports the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis.   
Schneider (1998) further investigated the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis to see if findings 
from a physical task would extend to memory tasks.  Four-, five-, and six-year-old children 
conducted two experiments involving two psychomotor tasks (jumping task and ball throwing 
task) and two memory tasks (memory span prediction task and hide and seek task).  Each 
experiment had two conditions, wish and expectation.  In the wish condition, children were told 
to either place a green flag where they wished to jump (jumping task) or put the amount of balls 
they wished to throw in a different container from which they would be tested with (ball 
throwing condition).  Over three trials, children estimated their performance and were given 
feedback afterwards.  After the last trial, children were asked to move a flag to the place that they 
had last reached, or place the same amount of balls that they had thrown into the container during 
the test, into the plastic bucket.  Schneider (1998) also investigated the Wishful Thinking 
Hypothesis by asking children to make a prediction performance for another child performing 
the same physical task.  Each child would watch and make a prediction on how well another 
child would perform a task, and then they would participate in the same task themselves.  Before 
their participation, they would make a prediction judgment about their performance ability for 
the task.  Studies show that children report that they would perform better on a psychomotor task 
than another child would; meaning they gave higher performance predictions for themselves than 
they did for predicting another child’s ability (Schneider, 1998).  This suggests that children are 
better able to assess another child’s physical ability more than their own; children believe that 
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they had greater performance ability than another child.  Such findings regarding the Wishful 
Thinking Hypothesis provide important insight for children’s overconfident judgment 
predictions.  However, the tasks used in the previous studies were psychomotor in nature rather 
than metacognitive.  Thus, children are reflecting on their physical abilities, which may be 
fundamentally different than assessing their cognitive capabilities.  To address this concern, 
Schneider (1998) also used memory tasks to investigate the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis.   
In experiment two of Schneider’s (1998) study, children participated in two cognitive 
tasks: a memory span prediction task and a hide and seek task.  In the memory span task, 
children listened to ten words and were asked to repeat them back to the researcher once they 
thought they could remember them.  In the hide and seek task, children were shown 10 pairs of 
pictures in which one picture out of a pair was hidden in a house.  Children were instructed to put 
the twin of that picture where its pair was hidden.  Across both of these tasks, children were 
asked to make a wish prediction and an expectation prediction for their performance.  Thus, 
children were asked how many they wished to remember and how many they expected to 
remember on each trial.  Results showed that for both memory tasks, children gave similar 
values for wish and expectation predictions.  Overall, children overestimated their cognitive 
performance but six-year-olds were more accurate than the four-year-olds in predicting their 
performance on the task.  Schneider’s (1998) results, coupled with Stipek et al.’s (1984) findings, 
indicate that children do not differentiate between their expectations and desires during both 
physical and cognitive tasks.  These studies support the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis which 
states that children may be establishing their predictions based on what they want to happen and 
not on what they think they can truly accomplish.  However, the literature is mixed regarding this 
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explanation for young children’s overconfident performance predictions.  For example, Lipko et 
al.’s (2009) findings with a different task did not support the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis. 
Lipko et al. (2009) extended on Flavell’s (1970) research and hypothesized that if 
children were familiar with the task, they could more accurately assess their performance ability 
and in turn overconfidence would decrease across trials.  Investigators implemented a study 
opportunity prior to children’s predictions to see if it had an effect on overconfidence in four-and 
five-year-old children.  In the first experiment, children were shown ten pictures and given ten 
seconds to study them.  Next, experimenters asked the children how many of the pictures they 
thought they would be able to remember if they were covered.  They were then given one minute 
to recall as many pictures as they could and after the time limit was up the researchers told the 
children how many pictures they had recalled.  The procedure was repeated two additional times 
where children were presented with a new set of ten pictures each time.  Analyses showed that 
children’s overconfidence remained high across trials, however predictions decreased when 
presented with a new set of pictures.  In a second experiment, two trials were added, for a total of 
five.  Lipko et al. (2009) predicted that having five trials of experience with the picture recall 
task would decrease children’s overconfidence in their performance on the task.  In Experiment 
two, four- and five- year-olds made performance predictions for another child as well as for 
themselves on a picture recall task in order to assess the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis.  The 
results indicated that children’s self and other-predictions were not significantly different from 
each other; children predicted that other children would perform just as well as they would in the 
memory task.  These findings are not consistent with previous research using psychomotor and 
cognitive tasks that found that children gave more accurate predictions of their own performance 
than for the performance of others (Schneider, 1999; Stipek et al., 1984).  This inconsistency 
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suggests that the Wishful Thinking Hypothesis cannot be the only explanation for young 
children’s persistent overconfidence. 
Memory monitoring deficiencies may be another possible explanation for young 
children’s overconfidence (Lipko et al., 2009; Lipko-Speed, 2013; Schneider, 1998).  That is, if 
children cannot accurately monitor and remember their own performance on a task, they will not 
be able to use that knowledge to predict how they will perform on a task in the future or on 
similar tasks.  Lipko et al. (2009) examined this memory monitoring deficiency hypothesis in her 
third experiment.  Four- and five-year-olds were asked to study ten pictures.  After studying, they 
were asked to predict how many pictures they would be able to remember once they were 
covered up.  Half of the children were asked to make a postdiction before their prediction on the 
second trial.  Specifically children were asked, “How many pictures did you remember last 
time?”  This was repeated across two more trials with ten different pictures on each trial.  The 
results of this experiment showed that children were accurately able to remember the amount of 
pictures they had recalled in the previous trial.  These results are consistent with Schneider 
(1998), which also found that children’s postdictions were relatively accurate.  These findings 
(Lipko et al., 2009; Schneider, 1998) contradict the claim that children have memory monitoring 
deficiencies; children in fact, seem to be quite accurate when prompted by the researcher to 
recall their previous performance.  Although children were able to accurately remember how 
they performed on a task, they failed to apply it to their prediction of future performance on a 
similar task (Lipko et al., 2009; Schneider, 1998) where their performance predictions remained 
overconfident on subsequent trials.   
Lipko-Speed (2013) further investigated the findings of Lipko et al. (2009), specifically 
the finding that young children’s persistent overconfidence remained despite their accurate 
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monitoring ability.  Lipko-Speed (2013) asked children to make an additional recall prediction 
for the same set of pictures immediately after their first judgment prediction and recall attempt of 
the pictures.  More specifically, four-and five-year-olds were presented with and given ten 
seconds to study ten pictures.  They were then asked to predict how many pictures they would be 
able to remember once they were covered up.  Children were given sixty seconds to recall the 
pictures once covered and then the experimenter told the children how many pictures they 
actually recalled.  Next, the experimenter said, “I am going to ask you to try to remember the 
pictures hiding underneath the paper again.  How many of these pictures will you be able to 
remember this time?”  The children then provided a second recall prediction, recalled as many 
pictures as they could, and again the experimenter provided feedback.  This procedure was then 
repeated with new pictures for three more trials.  It was hypothesized that children would use the 
feedback given by the experimenters after the first task and apply it to a future task.  The results 
demonstrated that children’s second predictions within each of the four trials were significantly 
less overconfident than the first predictions for the same set of pictures. This result suggests that 
children are able to remember how well they performed (after being told by an experimenter) 
and then apply that knowledge to their second recall predictions for the same set of pictures.  
However, between trials when new pictures were presented, children’s overconfidence returned.  
Children were able to adjust and lower their recall prediction when asked to recall the same set 
of pictures a second time, but when presented with a new set of pictures and asked to study and 
make a prediction, they were just as overconfident as their very first recall prediction.  Children 
fail to apply their knowledge between trials but appear to be able to do so within trials.  This 
study provides important implications that children can use that knowledge to predict their 
performance on a future task under certain conditions. 
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Influence of Feedback on young children’s overconfidence  
Further investigations regarding why children are persistently overconfident have also 
explored how children can be more accurate predictors of their performance ability 
(Clifford,1978; Lipko et al. 2009; Lipko-Speed, 2013; Schneider, 1998; Stipek et al. 1984).  
Explorations of ways to help children adjust their performance predictions to be a more accurate 
estimator of their ability have primarily focused on the use of feedback; physically or vocally 
directing children to their previous performance on a task.  Feedback regarding children’s 
previous performance was presented to see if they would apply it to a subsequent prediction on a 
similar task.  It was thought that if researchers directed children to their past performance on a 
previous task, it would increase the children’s awareness of their actual ability.  In turn, children 
would lower their future performance predictions to a more accurate estimate of their skill 
(Lipko-Speed, 2013; Lipko et al., 2009).  For example, Clifford (1978) looked at how age and 
expectancy influenced children’s overconfident judgments on a working puzzle task.  Children in 
his study gave more accurate future predictions when researchers monitored and gave feedback 
about their past performance.  First, third, and fifth graders were studied to see whether visual 
and auditory feedback improved a child’s ability to use their past performance for future 
predictions.  Across four trials, each child was given a puzzle to complete in a certain amount of 
time.  In the control group, children were not given any feedback on how many pieces they 
correctly placed.  At the end of the third trial, the children were asked, “How many pieces do you 
think you will place correctly before I tell you to stop?”  In the feedback group children were 
given a recording sheet in which the researcher marked off a square for every piece the child had 
correctly placed in the puzzle.  After each trial, the experimenter counted aloud the amount of 
pieces the child correctly placed.  The number total was then placed on the top of the recording 
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sheet.  Again, after the third trial, children were asked, “How many pieces do you think you will 
place correctly before I tell you to stop?” and that number was also recorded on the recording 
sheet.  The results showed that overall children were overconfident but older children were more 
accurate predictors of their future performance than younger children.  The control group gave 
less accurate (more overconfident) predictions of their future performance than those in the 
feedback group.  More specifically, when researchers overtly monitored how many puzzle pieces 
the children in the feedback group had correctly placed, children were more accurate in 
predicting how many pieces they had correctly placed in the fourth trial than those in the control 
group.  These findings suggest that children were able to adjust their performance predictions on 
a future task based on feedback provided by an experimenter.  Children, however, were not 
asked to give performance predictions across trials, but only before the last trial, so there is no 
way of knowing if their decrease in overconfident judgments decreased across trials.  
Stipek et al. (1984) extended Clifford’s (1978) findings regarding how feedback can 
decrease young children’s overconfidence on a psychomotor task.  Stipek et al. (1984) 
investigated whether four-year-olds could make more realistic performance predictions when 
given visual and auditory feedback about their past performance on a task.  Stipek’s (1984) 
study, described earlier, implies that preschool-age children are capable of applying 
experimenter-provided-feedback about their past performance to judgments about future 
performance.  This is consistent with Lipko-Speed (2013) research.  However, the results of 
Stipek et al.’s (1984) study may have been task dependent in that the children had no control 
over their performance in the game that they participated.  That is, unbeknownst to them, the 
children were not basing their predictions on their own ability but instead on the experimenter 
manipulated outcomes.  It is possible that their predictions would have been more accurate if 
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their performance reflected their actual skills.  Despite this limitation, results suggest that 
feedback indeed helps children in making more accurate predictions of their performance on 
psychomotor tasks.  Other researchers have attempted to apply these findings to cognitive tasks. 
As mentioned earlier, Schneider (1998) also found that children had the ability to 
accurately relay how well they performed in a task when researchers gave feedback and directed 
them to their past performance.  Lipko et al. (2009) also found that although children were able 
to accurately recall how well they had just performed on a memory task, they were unable to 
subsequently apply that knowledge to their future predictions for performance on a similar task. 
Similarly, Lipko-Speed (2013) demonstrated that after receiving performance feedback and 
being directed to the fact they would be recalling the same set of pictures as they did in the 
previous test, children lowered their second prediction on a picture recall task.  These findings 
suggest that there may be ways to decrease children’s overconfidence.   
External vs Self Monitoring 
The current study seeks to further investigate possible ways to reduce children’s 
overconfidence on cognitive tasks.  Specifically, this study investigates the influence of a 
modified self-recording activity on children’s performance predictions on a picture recall task.  
Will participating in a task in which children can visually and physically assess their own 
performance help to lower their overconfidence when predicting their performance for a future 
task?  Self-recording, or recording of one’s own behavior (Broden, Hall, & Mitts, 1971), has 
been studied to examine whether self-monitoring is more effective than teacher- or external-
monitoring in behavior modification (Broden et al., 1971; Dunlap & Dunlap, 1989; Kazdin, 
1974; Hallahan, Lloyd, Kneedler, & Marshall, 1982).  Based on the existing literature, it is 
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hypothesized that self-assisted monitoring will make a difference in reducing young children’s 
overconfidence on a picture recall task.   
Previous research has investigated different types of monitoring and whether the type of 
monitoring differentially affects children’s behavior and learning.  Broden et al. (1971) used a 
single subject design to investigate two different monitoring tasks.  Researchers gave two 
students a self-recording mechanism to see whether it increased study behavior or decreased talk 
out behavior more than if a teacher was reinforcing their good behavior.  Baseline behavior was 
recorded for seven days, after which the students were each given a recording sheet for the seven 
following days.  Each time the students produced a desirable behavior, they put a plus in a 
square, and if they executed an undesirable behavior, they put a minus in a square.  During the 
intervention phase, the students also saw a counselor who praised them when they behaved in the 
desired way.  After the self-recording week (intervention phase 1), students were not 
administered the recording sheets for the following five days (baseline phase 2), and were given 
them again the following week (intervention phase 2).  During baseline phase 2, the students’ 
teachers were instructed to focus on the individual students being observed and whenever they 
had the chance, to give them praise.  Also during this period, another researcher was recording 
both students’ behavior.  Results showed that student 1 increased her behavior (studying) during 
the self-recording phase of intervention phase one.  During the first day of baseline phase 2, the 
student’s behavior was still very high and it was noted that the teacher’s rate of attention to that 
student also was high.  The second day during baseline phase 2, the student’s study behavior 
declined which shows that she was reliant on the self-recording sheet.  This drop in study rate 
persisted even when the self-recording sheets were administered again during intervention phase 
2.  Similar results were found with student 2 pertaining to decreasing talk outs.  Results 
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suggested that self-recording affected the desired behavior.  Self-recording made the students 
more conscious of their behavior and directed their attention to what they needed to change (i.e. 
studying or talk outs).   However, it is still unclear whether the extent to which external 
monitoring from the teacher and counselor played a role in the observed behavior changes.   
Because teacher praise was provided in tandem with self-recording, it is possible that such 
teacher reactivity may have influenced the implementation of the self-recording activity.   
 In a related study, Hallahan et al. (1982) examined whether teacher assessment or self-
assessment differentially affected the behavior of a child, Peter, with a learning disability.  
Specifically, the study investigated whether feedback from the teacher compared to self-
assessment was more efficacious in increasing his on-task behavior.  The self-assessment 
condition consisted of an audiotape recorder producing a tone every forty-two seconds in which 
Peter was told to ask himself, “Was I paying attention?”, after which he would record “yes” or 
“no” on his recording sheet.  The teacher assessment condition was very similar except when the 
tone rang, the teacher told Peter whether he was on task or not and Peter recorded her assessment 
on his recording sheet.  This procedure was done in twenty-minute intervals and the conditions 
were counterbalanced with intervals of no condition over fifty days.  The results suggested that 
both assessments increased Peter’s on-task behavior but a greater increase was observed when 
the child did both self-assessment and recording.  Even though self-assessment was shown to 
have a greater impact on Peter’s on-task behavior, the increase was not significantly different 
from when he received feedback from his teacher.  This may have been due to the reactivity 
between both conditions; Peter knew that he was being observed so he may have been more on 
task when monitored by his teacher because of the attention he was receiving.  This study 
concludes that self-monitoring is of some importance with regards to changing a target behavior. 
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Dunlap and Dunlap (1989) also investigated children with learning disabilities in the 
hopes of providing more insight into the implementation of self-monitoring in behavior 
modification.  Initially, three students were given a subtraction worksheet daily, teachers 
verbally told the students how to complete it, and then were given feedback on their 
performance.  After this was done for a week, the self-monitoring condition was implemented, 
the students were instructed in the same way but were given a checklist in which they were to 
record a plus for each step they did correctly or a minus for each step they did not get right.  
After, the students handed in their sheets and were given a point for each correctly monitored 
checklist.  The results of this study indicated that when the self-monitoring checklist was 
implemented, the amount of correct answers for each worksheet across trials increased.  They 
answered more questions correctly when using the self-monitoring checklist compared to when 
they received teacher feedback.  This implies that the students were better able to monitor what 
steps they were doing wrong and correct them when using the self-monitoring aid.  Interestingly, 
when the self-monitoring checklists were withdrawn the students maintained their improvements 
and continued to perform with more success than they had before the implementation.  This 
study concludes that self-monitoring checklist’s aided the children in responding more accurately 
and consistently.  Based on this research, children have the ability to keep track of their correct 
and incorrect responses and use them to increase a behavior on future trials.  By giving children a 
physical task to keep track of their mistakes, the children were able to adjust their future 
performance based on their previous assessment.  Another physical recording technique, such as 
the use of a star chart, has been found to influence children’s behavior.  
In a case study, Lyon (1983) implemented the use of a star chart to treat a 12-year-old 
boy’s lip-biting habit.  The participant had an unpleasant and swollen lip as a result of biting his 
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lip during sleep.  The boy’s mother had noticed blood on the boy’s pillow for two years and his 
pediatrician referred him to a psychologist to modify his behavior. After the initial interview, the 
boy started to mark his previous behaviors of lip biting on a star chart.  He and his mother were 
to check his pillow each morning for blood to see if he had been biting his lip during the night.  
If there was blood on the pillow, the boy was not given a star to mark on the chart.  If the pillow 
was clean, the boy was given a blue star to mark on his chart.  If the boy received three blue stars 
in a row (marked on consecutive days), he was given a gold star, which earned him a reward.  By 
the third week he received stars every night, and over the course of six months, the lip biting 
stopped completely.  In this case, Lyon (1983) implies that the use of self-monitoring with a star 
chart in combination with providing reinforcements reduced the boy’s negative lip-biting 
behavior.  
Current Study 
 As previously described, the metacognitive literature on overconfident judgment 
predictions uses the term monitoring to describe the process of an experimenter providing 
feedback (visual/auditory) to children about their performance to help them use information 
about their past performance to potentially decrease their predictions about their future 
performance  (e.g. Lipko, 2009; Lipko-Speed, 2013).  However, the applied behavioral analysis 
literature uses the terms self-recording, self-assessment, or self-monitoring when referring to the 
act of children recording their own performance when attempting to increase or decrease a 
desired behavior (Broden et al., 1971; Dunlap & Dunlap, 1989; Hallahan, et al., 1982).  The 
current experiment will use the term monitoring to refer to the act of keeping track of a child’s 
performance.  Specifically, two types of monitoring will be investigated – self-assisted and 
experimenter.  Experimenter monitoring signifies that the researcher will be monitoring and 
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providing feedback to the child regarding his or her performance.  Self-assisted monitoring 
indicates that children, with the help of the experimenter, will monitor their own performance 
and provide feedback to the experimenter regarding their own performance ability.  
Hypothesis one poses that children’s overconfidence will decrease within trials in both 
the experimenter monitored group and the self-assisted monitored group (replicating Lipko-
Speed, 2013).  Children will give less overconfident second performance predictions for a set of 
pictures, compared to their first performance predictions for the same set of pictures.  Hypothesis 
two anticipates that in the self-assisted monitored group, children’s overconfidence will decrease 
between trials.  Children will give less overconfident judgment predictions when presented with 
a new set of pictures.   More specifically, it is expected that children’s overconfidence on the 
initial predictions of each subsequent pair of trials will be lower compared to the very first 
judgment prediction on the initial pair of trials. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of fifty-two children (30 males and 22 females) were recruited from various 
preschools and children’s programs in the surrounding areas of Rochester and Buffalo, New 
York.  Participants were preschool age, between 41 months and 72 months, with a mean age of 
57 months (4 years and 9 months) who were all from a diverse socioeconomic background.   
Procedure 
 A letter of informed consent was sent home with the children asking their parents’ 
permission for their child’s participation in the study.  Before starting the study, children were 
asked if they wished to participate in the experiment, and upon their assent, the experiment 
continued.  Children received stickers after their participation in the study.   
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 In this between-subjects experimental design, children were matched by random 
assignment into two groups, counterbalancing gender.  One group, of twenty-five participants 
(11 girls and 14 boys), participated in a procedure similar to Lipko-Speed (2013).  This group is 
referred to as the experimenter monitored group.  The second group of 27 participants (11 girls 
and 16 boys) participated in the same procedure with one important difference.  This group is 
referred to as the self-assisted monitored group.  Children were tested individually in a quiet 
room distant from any distractions.  In the experimenter monitored group, children were asked to 
sit next to the experimenter at a table with a large 3 x 2-foot magnetic board and asked to count 
to ten.  Then, a group of ten 4 x 6-inch colored pictures of objects (see appendix for the list of 
pictures) was presented face down and the children counted one by one how many pictures there 
were in the pile.  An experimenter then individually placed each picture on the magnetic board.  
As the experimenter put a picture on the magnetic board the child named each one (replacing any 
pictures that the child could not name correctly or noting if he/she uses an unusual yet correct 
label).  After all ten pictures were named, children were given ten seconds to study the pictures.  
The children were then asked, “How many of these pictures do you think you will be able to 
remember once I cover them up?”  A blue towel was then placed over the pictures and the 
experimenter presented the children with a bowl filled with blocks in the shape of stars.  The 
children were then told, “Ok, I have covered the pictures.  Name as many pictures as you can 
remember.  Every time you remember a picture, I will say yes, and I will take a star from the 
bowl and put it on the table in front of you.  If I say no, then you did not remember a picture 
from the board so I will not take a star out of the bowl (experimenter monitoring).”  As children 
recalled pictures that were underneath the towel, the experimenter said yes to those that were 
accurate and indicated to the child to take a star out of the bowl and place it in front of them.    
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Children were given sixty seconds to recall as many pictures as they could.  After sixty seconds, 
the experimenter told the child how many pictures they correctly recalled. The researcher then 
asked the children to give a recall prediction for the same set of pictures they just attempted to 
recall.  Specifically, the experimenter say, “I am going to ask you to try to remember the pictures 
hiding underneath the blue towel again.  How many of these pictures will you be able to 
remember this time?”  After giving their prediction, children were given sixty seconds to recall 
as many pictures as possible.  Following their second recall attempt, the pictures were uncovered 
and the experimenter told the children the number of pictures they remembered correctly.  This 
entire procedure was repeated three more times with new sets of 10 pictures for each pair of 
additional trials.  Researchers recorded each child’s recall predictions and performance. 
 The children in the self-assisted monitored group participated in the same procedure as 
the experimenter monitored group with one important change.  Children in this group were asked 
to monitor their own recall in combination with the experimenter assisting the children in their 
monitoring.  Specifically, children were given a bowl filled with ten small blocks in the shapes of 
stars.  After the children named, studied, and made a recall prediction, they were presented with 
the bowl of stars and told, “Every time you remember a picture, I will say yes, and you will take 
a star from the bowl and put it on the table next to you.  If I say no, then you did not remember a 
picture from the board so do not take a star out of the bowl (self-assisted monitoring).”  As 
children accurately recalled pictures the experimenter said yes, and upon that cue, children took a 
star out of the bowl and placed it in front of them.  After the sixty seconds passed, the children 
were told, “Ok, time is up!  Can you count how many stars are on the table?”  After children 
counted out loud the amount of stars that were placed in front of them, they were then asked, 
“How many pictures from the board did you remember?”  If children said that they did not 
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remember or did not know, the experimenter reminded them, “Remember that every time you 
remembered a picture, you took a star out of the bowl.  How many pictures from the board did 
you remember?” Once the child gave a self-monitored number, the procedure continued in the 
exact same fashion as in the experimenter-monitored group for three more trials.    
 
Results 
Analyses were first conducted with gender as a factor, but the main effect of gender and 
all interactions including it were not significant, so it is not discussed further.  Two tailed mixed 
analyses of variance were conducted to test the two proposed hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
stated was that children’s overconfidence would decrease within trials in both the experimenter 
monitored group and the self-assisted monitored group (replicating Lipko-Speed, 2013).  The 
second proposed that in the self-assisted monitored group, children’s overconfidence would 
decrease between trials.   
Each child was scored individually.  Mean prediction accuracy (predicted recall - actual 
recall) was calculated for each trial (Table 1).  Children made two predictions and two recall 
attempts on each trial.  In order to test hypothesis 1, a 2 (Task: first prediction or second 
prediction) x 2 (Group: self-assisted vs. experimenter) x 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, or 4) mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted of children’s prediction accuracy and yielded a significant 
main effect of task, F(1,50) = 12.88, p < .001, n2 = 0.81 and a significant interaction between 
task and trial, F(3,150) = 2.86, p < .001. No significant main effects were found for group. 
Prediction accuracy in the experimenter monitored group did not differ from prediction accuracy 
in the self-assisted monitored group, (F < 1). The act of monitoring their own performance did 
not improve children’s prediction accuracy within trials. Thus, the first part of hypothesis 1 was 
not supported.  However, two tailed follow-up t-tests revealed that children’s second predictions 
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were significantly more accurate than their first predictions on trial 4, t(51) = 4.44, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.62 and approaching significance on trial 3, t(51) = 1.96, p = .055.  However, 
children’s second predictions were not significantly more accurate than their first predictions on 
the first two trials, ts < 1.34 (Table 2) contrary to the findings of Lipko-Speed (2013) that found 
that children’s prediction accuracy improved within a trial across all four trials.  Thus, the second 
part of hypothesis 1 was only partially supported.  
Hypothesis two predicted that children would give less overconfident judgment 
predictions when presented with a new set of pictures.   This hypothesis was not supported.  
Surprisingly, the finding was in the opposite direction.  Children’s first predictions in Trial 1 
were actually significantly more accurate than their first predictions in Trial 4, t(51) = -2.52, p = 
0.015, d = .44.  This was also approaching significance between Trials 3 and 4; t(51) = -2.31, p = 
0.025.   Thus, children’s overconfidence between the first and last trial surprisingly increased 
rather than decreased or remained the same.  
Across trials, children’s second judgment accuracy scores were not significantly different 
than first judgment accuracy scores on the following trial, ts(51) < -1.05 , ps > .05 (Table 3), 
except between Trial 3 and Trial 4, t(51) = -3.60, p = .001, d = 0.50.  Children’s second 
predictions on a trial were not significantly more accurate from their first predictions on the 
immediately subsequent trial.  However, children’s second predictions in Trial 3 were 
significantly more accurate than their first predictions on Trial 4.  
Prediction Magnitudes 
Pertaining to prediction magnitudes, means for each trial are reported in Table 1.  The 
first and second prediction magnitudes were compared across trials using a 2 (Prediction Timing: 
first prediction or second prediction) x 2 (Group: self-assisted vs. experimenter) x 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 
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3, or 4) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) which yielded a significant main effect of 
prediction timing, F(1,50) = 20.71, p < .001, n2 = 0.46 and trial, F(1,50) = 20.14 , p < .001, n2 = 
0.54 but no significant interactions.   
On each trial, children’s first predictions were significantly higher in magnitude than 
their second predictions, ts(51) > 2.33, ps < .01, ds > 0.23 (Table 7).  Children predicted that they 
could recall more pictures in their first prediction compared to their second prediction for the 
same set of pictures.  Taken together, the data replicates Lipko-Speed (2013), specifically 
looking at predictions within a trial.  Children appeared to have some knowledge that their past 
performance predicts their future performance within the same set of pictures.   
When looking at prediction magnitudes across trials, first predictions between Trials 1 
and 2, Trials 2 and 3, and Trials 3 and 4 were not significantly different, ts(51) < 1.80 (Table 8).  
However, between Trials 1 and 4, first predictions were significantly different t(51) = 3.19, p = 
0.002, ds = 0.44.  When presented with a new set of pictures, children’s first prediction on trial 4 
were significantly lower than their first prediction on Trial 1. Second predictions were also 
significantly different between trials, ts(51) > 2.13, ps < .038, ds > 0.30 (Table 9), except 
between Trial 2 and 3 (t < 1).  Children’s second predictions in the previous trial were 
significantly higher in value than their future predictions.   
Between trials when new sets of pictures were presented, there was some suggestive 
evidence that children were learning from their previous experiences but predictions did not 
decrease consistently between sequential trials. Children’s second predictions on a trial were not 
significantly different than their first predictions on the subsequent trial, ts(51) < -1.67, ps > 
0.101.  Children’s second predictions on each trial were not significantly different than their first 
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prediction on the succeeding trial when presented with a new set of pictures. Thus, children did 
not apply previous knowledge to future performance in a consistent manner. 
Recall Magnitudes 
Mean recall magnitudes are reported in Table 1.  Comparing the first and second recall 
values across trials, a 2 (Recall Timing: first or second) x 2 (Group: self-assisted vs. 
experimenter) x 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, or 4) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded significant 
main effects of timing, F(1,50) = 56.3, p < .001, n2 = 0.03 and trial F(3,150) = 37.61, p < .001, n2 
= 0.97 but no significant interactions.  
In Trials 1, 2, and 3, children recalled significantly more pictures on their first recall 
attempt than on their second recall attempt within Trials 1, 2 and 3, ts(51) > 1.69, ps < .098, ds > 
.23 (Table 4).  Children recalled more pictures in their first recall attempt than on their second 
when asked for the same set of pictures.   
Mean number of pictures recalled on the first recall attempt were also significantly 
different across trials, ts(51) > 4.90, ps < .05, ds > 0.68 (Table 5), except between Trials 2 and 3, 
t(51) = .82, p = .42.  Children’s recall ability decreased between trials.  They did not significantly 
remember as many pictures when presented with a new set of pictures as they did in their first 
recall attempt in a previous trial.  However, the number of pictures that children remembered in 
their first prediction on Trial 2 did not significantly differ from the number of pictures they 
recalled in their first recall attempt on Trial 3.   
Second recalls were also significantly different across trials, ts(51) > 3.18, ps < .003, ds > 
0.44 (Table 6), except between Trials 2 and 3, t(51) = .24, p = .81.  In trials 1 and 4, children 
remembered significantly less pictures when they recalled pictures a second time for the same set 
of pictures.  Additionally, between consecutive recalls, mean number of pictures recalled on the 
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second recall attempt on Trial 1 was significantly greater than the mean number of pictures 
recalled on the first recall attempt on the second trial, t(51) = 3.97, p < 0.001, d = 0.55.  The 
same result was found between the second recall attempt on the third trial and the first recall 
attempt on the fourth trial, t(51) = 4.28, p < 0.001, d = 0.40.  Children recalled significantly more 
pictures on their second recall on Trials 1 and 3 than they did on their first recall attempt on 
Trials 2 and 4. 
Table 1 
Mean prediction and recall values across trials. 
 Accuracy Prediction Recall 
Group Exp. SA Exp. Exp. Exp. SA 
Trial 1       
First 2.44 (0.78) 3.44 (0.75) 8.00 (0.56) 7.78 (0.65) 2.44 (0.78) 3.44 (0.75) 
    Second 2.00 (0.63) 2.74 (0.58) 6.69 (0.49) 6.74 (.58) 2.00 (0.63) 2.74 (0.58) 
Trial 2       
First 3.68 (0.68) 3.48 (0.71) 7.20 (0.72) 6.81 (0.62) 3.68 (0.68) 3.48 (0.71) 
Second 2.96 (0.76) 2.81 (0.64) 5.84 (0.69) 5.78 (0.58) 2.96 (0.76) 2.81 (0.64) 
Trial 3       
First 3.48 (0.67) 3.44 (0.46) 6.64 (0.64) 6.67 (0.64) 3.48 (0.67) 3.44 (0.46) 
Second 2.80 (0.79) 2.37 (0.71) 5.68 (0.69) 5.19 (0.68) 2.80 (0.79) 2.37 (0.71) 
Trial 4       
First 5.36 (0.71) 3.81 (0.62) 7.00 (0.67) 5.52 (0.62) 5.36 (0.71) 3.81 (0.62) 
Second 3.16 (0.64) 1.74 (0.58) 5.20 (0.68) 3.44 (.59 3.16 (0.64) 1.74 (0.58) 
* Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 2 
 
Repeated measure t-test results for judgment accuracy within trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
 
Overconfidence 1A 
Overconfidence 1B 
 
0.58 
 
0.43 
 
1.33 
 
0.189 
Overconfidence 2A 
Overconfidence 2B 
0.69 0.51 1.35 0.183 
Overconfidence 3A 
Overconfidence 3B 
0.88 0.45 1.97 0.055 
Overconfidence 3A 
Overconfidence 4B 
2.13 0.48 4.44** 0.000 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
 
Table 3 
 
Repeated measure t-test results for judgment accuracy between subsequent trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
Overconfidence 1B 
Overconfidence 2A 
-1.19 0.49 -2.45 0.018 
Overconfidence 2B 
Overconfidence 3A 
-.58 0.54 -1.05 0.297 
Overconfidence 3B 
Overconfidence 4A 
-1.98 0.55 -3.60* 0.001 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
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Table 4 
 
Repeated measure t-test results for mean recall within trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
List 1 Recall 1 – 
List 1 Recall 2 
0.46 0.22 2.13 0.038 
List 2 Recall 1 – 
List 2 Recall 2 
0.50 0.191 2.61 0.012 
List 3 Recall 1 – 
List 3 Recall 2 
0.35 0.21 1.69* 0.098 
List 4 Recall 1 – 
List 4 Recall 2 
-0.92 0.23 -0.89 
0.396 
 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
 
Table 5 
 
Repeated measure t-test results for first mean recalls between trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
List 1 Recall 1 – 
List 2 Recall 1 
1.5 0.31 4.90** 0.000 
List 2 Recall 1 – 
List 3 Recall 1 
0.23 0.28 0.822 0.415 
List 3 Recall 1 – 
List 4 Recall 1 
1.52 0.27 5.66** 
0.000 
 
List 4 Recall 1 – 
List 1 Recall 1 
-3.25 0.33 -9.73** 
0.000 
 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
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Table 6 
 
Repeated measure t-test results for mean recall within trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
List 1 Recall 2 – 
List 2 Recall 2 
1.54 3.27 4.71** 0.000 
List 2 Recall 2 – 
List 3 Recall 2 
0.08 0.32 0.24 0.810 
List 3 Recall 2 – 
List 4 Recall 2 
0.98 0.31 3.18* 0.003 
List 1 Recall 2 – 
List 4 Recall 2 
2.60 0.34 7.66** 
0.000 
 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
 
Table 7 
 
Repeated measure t-test results for prediction magnitudes within trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
List 1 Prediction 1 – 
List 1 Prediction 2 
1.04 0.38 2.74* 0.009 
List 2 Prediction 1 – 
List 2 Prediction 2 
1.19 0.51 2.33 0.24 
List 3 Prediction 1 – 
List 3 Prediction 2 
1.23 0.46 2.67* 0.010 
List 4 Prediction 1 – 
List 4 Prediction 2 
1.94 0.49 4.01** 0.000 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
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Table 8 
Repeated measure t-test results for first prediction magnitudes between trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
List 1 Prediction 1 – 
List 2 Prediction 1 
0.89 0.49 1.80 0.078 
List 2 Prediction 1 – 
List 3 Prediction 1 
0.35 0.51 0.68 0.501 
List 3 Prediction 1 – 
List 4 Prediction 1 
0.42 0.45 0.95 0.348 
List 1 Prediction 1 – 
List 4 Prediction 1 
1.65 0.52 3.19* 0.002 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
 
Table 9 
 
Repeated measure t-test results for second prediction magnitudes between trials 
 
 
M SEM t-test p-value 
List 1 Prediction 2 – 
List 2 Prediction 2 
1.04 0.49 2.13 0.038 
List 2 Prediction 2 – 
List 3 Prediction 2 
0.39 0.41 0.95 0.347 
List 3 Prediction 2 – 
List 4 Prediction 2 
1.14 0.43 2.64 0.011 
List 1 Prediction 2 – 
List 4 Prediction 2 
2.56 0.53 4.83** 0.000 
List 2 Prediction 2 – 
List 3 Prediction 2 
1.52 0.44 3.46* 0.001 
List 1 Prediction 2 – 
List 3 Prediction 2 
1.42 0.56 2.55 0.014 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001 
*M = mean sum for each row 
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Discussion 
Hypothesis one posed that that children’s overconfidence would decrease within trials in 
both the experimenter monitored group and the self-assisted monitored group (replicating Lipko-
Speed, 2013).    Children would give less overconfident second performance predictions for a set 
of pictures, compared to their first performance predictions for the same set of pictures.   
Results showed that there was no differences found between groups.  The only significant 
replication of Lipko-Speed’s (2013) pattern of decreased overconfidence was found in Trial 4.  
However, replication was found when children’s prediction magnitudes were analyzed rather 
than overconfidence.  Consistent with Lipko-Speed’s (2013) findings, children’s performance 
prediction magnitudes decreased within trials.  Thus, children provided a lower estimate of the 
number of pictures they would be able to recall the second time they predicted their performance 
for a set of pictures.  
Hypothesis two stated that children in the self-assisted monitored group would give lower 
recall predictions between trials for different sets of pictures.  By assisting in their own 
performance monitoring feedback, it was thought that children would be less overconfident.  
Results showed that children’s first predictions did decrease across trials - children predicted 
they would remember fewer pictures when presented with a new set of pictures, but this was 
only significant between Trials 1 and 3 and between Trials 1 and 4.  This could suggest that 
children were lowering their predictions on purpose and learning from their past experiences 
because their predictions were decreasing between some trials.  However, they were not 
decreasing their predictions in all sequential trials.  If children were truly using the knowledge 
that the past predicts the future, their first predictions would have decreased between Trials 2 and 
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3 and between Trials 3 and 4 as well.  This was not found.  Instead, children’s first predictions 
were decreasing in an inconsistent manner.   
 Second predictions also decreased across trials (except between Trials 2 and 3) in that 
children predicted they would recall less pictures when asked to make a judgment for different 
sets of pictures.  Children were making adjustments in their predictions, yet findings determined 
that children’s second predictions on a trial were not significantly different than their first 
predictions on the subsequent trial.  Specifically, immediately following children’s second 
judgment predictions, their first prediction when presented with a new set of pictures were not 
significantly different than their second prediction in the previous trial.  This provides further 
support that children were not purposefully decreasing their predictions based on experience.   
Even though children’s predictions decreased within all and between some trials, their 
overconfidence scores did not.  Because children were recalling fewer pictures every time they 
were presented with a new set of pictures, overconfidence remained high.  Children were still 
overconfident because both prediction and recall magnitudes were declining together.  The 
implementation of this investigation’s self-assisted monitoring task did not aid in decreasing 
children’s overconfident judgment predictions on future tasks. 
It was intended for the stars used in the self-assisted monitored group to aid children in 
making them better predictors of their performance abilities.  Physically monitoring their 
performance by moving a star each time they accurately remembered a picture, it was thought 
that children would be better able to keep track of their performance and apply their knowledge 
of their past ability to a new but similar task.  Dunlap and Dunlap (1989) used a similar self-
monitoring task to increase students’ mathematic skills.  Children were given a daily checklist 
where they were to record a plus for each step they did correctly or a minus for each step they 
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did not get right on a subtraction worksheet.  Researchers found that when self-monitoring 
checklists were implemented, the amount of right answers for each subtraction worksheet 
increased across trials.  This study implies that by giving children a physical task to keep track of 
and monitor their own mistakes and correct steps, they were able to adjust their future 
performances based on their previous assessments.  Monitoring helped children in Dunlap and 
Dunlap’s (1989) study, however in the current study, the self-assisted monitoring 
implementation did not help children use their past performance ability to predict their future. 
A possible reason why Dunlap and Dunlap’s (1989) self-monitoring implementation was 
effective and not the current study’s monitoring implementation may be due to the children’s 
age.  Even though Dunlap and Dunlap’s (1989) participants had learning disabilities, they were 
still much older than the children in this study.  Four- and five-year-old children may be too 
young to benefit from a self-monitoring aid.  The self-assisted monitoring task in this 
investigation may have been too difficult.  The children may not have the cognitive capability yet 
to understand that using a monitoring device will help them in predicting their future 
performance.  With the memory task used in Lipko-Speed’s (2013) study already being 
cognitively straining, it also may have taken children longer to understand how to play the game 
because there were more components to it than her original methods.  Task difficulty may have 
influenced the results where if children had more time to understand all of the components of the 
game, they may have understood what the stars were used for.  Conversely, fatigue also may 
have affected the results in that children became tired after the second trial.  This may have 
caused the increase in overconfidence seen between Trials 3 and 4.  Children were more 
overconfident when making a prediction for a new set of pictures than their first recall prediction 
in the first trial.  Children were getting agitated and tired mid-way through the protocol, which 
SELF-ASSISTED MONITORING AND RECALL  
 
 
32 
may have led them to think unclearly and not focus on the task at hand.  Furthermore, the 
handling of the stars by the experimenter and the children may have distracted the participants.  
While playing the game, children were more focused on keeping track of and playing with the 
stars than they were on recalling the pictures.  Using the stars may have also interrupted the 
children’s recall.  Instead of children themselves remembering to take a star out of the bowl 
every time they accurately recalled a picture, many times in the self-assisted monitored group, 
children had to be prompted to do so.  This may have influenced the children’s ability to 
remember as many pictures as they could have because the experimenter interfered with their 
recall.  Intended to be a monitoring aid, the stars seemed to have impacted the children’s 
overconfident metacognitive judgments in the opposite way the current investigation anticipated.  
If a different, less cognitively demanding metacognitive memory task were used instead 
of Lipko-Speed’s (2013) picture recall task, the children may have had more available mental 
resources to better understand what the stars were intended for and would have been able to use 
them appropriately.  Alternatively, if children were trained to use the stars as an aid with a 
different task and then given the opportunity to complete the picture recall task using the stars, 
perhaps the stars would have had the intended effect.  The cognitive load would be minimized if 
children were not learning how to use the stars while simultaneously completing the picture 
recall task.  It is also possible that the stars may be a more appropriate aid for a physical task like 
the ones used in Schneider (1998), rather than a cognitive task like the one used in the current 
investigation.  This would be interesting to investigate in future explorations. 
Investigations like the current study in which metacognitive development is researched 
have important implications for children’s learning.  Children who are overconfident may 
experience negative consequences as the result of their overestimations.  (Stipek & Mclver, 
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1989).  For example, if children feel confident that they have learned material successfully or 
mastered a task, they will likely stop studying or practicing.  However, if their true mastery of 
the skill or material does not match their estimation, their performance will likely be poor  
(Lipko, Dunlosky, Rawson, Swanm & Cook, 2007).  Understanding ways to help children be 
more accurate in their estimations of their own abilities can increase the likelihood that children 
experience success and mastery of tasks and material in a learning environment.   
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Appendix  
Pictures used for tasks: 
Trial 1: 
- House 
- Grapes  
- Bike 
- Cat  
- Flowers 
- Shirt 
- Present 
- Dress 
- Pizza 
- Shark 
 
Trial 2 
- Shoes  
- Cookies 
- Dog 
- Gloves 
- Keys 
- Bear 
- Train  
- Doll 
- Pencil 
- Bug 
 
Trial 3 
- Plane  
- Balloon  
- Sunglasses 
- Lion 
- Leaves 
- Heart 
- Fish 
- Banana  
- Fork  
- Lamp 
 
Trial 4 
- Cup 
- Light bulb 
- Comb 
- Rocks 
- Folders 
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- Coat 
- Cherries 
- Pants 
- Towel 
- Computer 
 
 
